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Privileging the Privileged?  Child             
Well-Being as a Justification for State 
Support of Marriage 
LAURA S. ADAMS* 
Is the state justified in supporting marriage?  This is the question that 
Robin Wilson seeks to answer by an examination of the effect of 
marriage on child well-being.  Proceeding from the assumption that 
child well-being is a key consideration in deciding whether state support 
for marriage is justified, Wilson examines two recent social science 
studies that have concluded that children living in households with their 
married, biological parents are better off than other children and further, 
that it is marriage rather than biological relationship that generates this 
benefit for children.1  Based on this social science literature, Wilson 
draws the normative conclusion that the state should continue to support, 
and perhaps even actively promote, marriage. 
I.  WILSON’S ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIES 
The first of the pair of studies Wilson examines, by Manning and Lamb, 
focuses on child well-being by examining outcomes for adolescents in 
 
 *  Assistant  Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; A.B. Princeton 
University; J.D. Harvard Law School.  Thanks to Robin Wilson for choosing such a rich 
topic and for her thoughtful and thought-provoking analysis, and thanks to Kim Yuracko 
for her insightful comments on Robin’s article.  Thanks also to the participants in the 
Institute for Law and Philosophy’s Conference on the Meaning of Marriage and to Larry 
Alexander and Steve Smith for inviting me to participate. 
 1. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the 
Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847 (2005). 
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various family structures.2  The second study, by Hofferth and Anderson, 
examines paternal investment in children.3  Both studies broke new 
ground by seeking to isolate the effects of marriage from the effects of 
biological relationship, largely by comparing four types of households: 
married households with two biological parents; married households 
with one biological parent; unmarried households with two biological 
parents; and unmarried households with one biological parent.4  These 
studies, and apparently almost every study done in the area, conclude 
that children in “nuclear families”—married households with two biological 
parents—have a greater level of well-being than other children.5  
Moreover, both studies conclude that it is marriage itself that explains 
this difference in child well-being.6 
After analyzing the studies, Wilson delves further into the question of 
causation.  She offers reasons to be skeptical of the conclusion that it is 
marriage itself that makes the difference for children, and she posits 
some alternative explanations for the results of the studies.7  Ultimately 
though, Wilson agrees that marriage itself has the power to make a 
difference in the lives of adults and children.8  Leaving aside her initial 
skeptical stance, Wilson devotes considerable attention to making the 
case for the transformative power of marriage, analyzing reasons for 
differences between cohabiting and marital relationships from the 
standpoint of adults and that of children.9  Wilson concludes by making 
the case for supporting marriage.  She posits the binary choice of pulling 
the state out of marriage entirely or using the state “to put more people 
into marriages” and asserts that the studies she analyzes support a 
preference for the second course of action—encouraging more people to 
marry. 10 
 
 2. Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting, 
Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 879 (2003). 
 3. Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology 
Versus Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 213 
(2003). 
 4. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 860.  See also Manning & Lamb, supra note 2, at 
879–80; Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 3, at 213, 219. 
 5. Wilson, supra note 1, at 861–62.  See also Manning & Lamb, supra note 2, at 
885; Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 3, at 229–30. 
 6. Wilson, supra note 1, at 859, 864.  See also Manning & Lamb, supra note 2, at 
890; Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 3, at 230. 
 7. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 865–67.  See also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does 
Marriage Make People Good or Do Good People Marry?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889, 
893–94 (2005). 
 8. Wilson, supra note 1, at 867. 
 9. Id. at 868–73. 
 10. Id. at 876. 
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II.  THE CHOICE OF A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH TO                    
EVALUATING MARRIAGE 
Wilson has chosen a child-centered approach to evaluating the 
meaning of marriage and this choice merits some attention.  The primary 
question Wilson seeks to answer is whether the state should support 
marriage, which appears to mean, at a minimum, whether the state should 
subsidize marriage, and more radically, whether the state should retain 
the institution at all.11  A secondary and related question is whether the 
state should actively promote marriage, which presumably means 
whether the state should seek to push people into marriage.12  These are 
two different, though related questions.  To answer these questions, 
Wilson assumes that “one important consideration” in retaining state 
support for marriage is whether marriage increases child well-being.13  
Recognizing that this assumption is open to some challenge, this 
commentary proceeds on the shared assumption that child well-being is 
in fact a significant consideration in evaluating state support for 
marriage.14 
III.  DOES MARRIAGE BEST PROMOTE CHILD WELL-BEING? 
Once one places the promotion of child well-being at the center of the 
meaning of marriage, one should also examine whether marriage best 
promotes child well-being, and not simply whether marriage has some 
positive effect on child well-being.  And if the answer is that marriage is 
not the best way to promote child well-being, that conclusion may mean 
that child well-being does not provide a good justification for supporting 
or promoting marriage. 
Wilson addresses the possibility that the state might have better ways 
to promote child well-being than the more indirect method of supporting 
marriage, notably through direct parental subsidies.15  However, in her 
view, “the question is not whether we should” provide direct state support 
to parents rather than indirect support through marriage benefits, but 
 
 11. Id. at 848–49. 
 12. Id. at 848. 
 13. Id. at 849. 
 14. However, as discussed, infra p. 884–85, it is a factor that should be placed in 
context with other relevant factors. 
 15. Wilson, supra note 1, at 877  (“No doubt it is true that, for instance, providing 
a subsidy directly to parents could yield high quality children in whom parents have 
heavily invested.”). 
ADAMS.DOC 8/7/2019  12:47 PM 
 
884 
“whether . . . the State is justified in continuing to support marriage.”16  
Wilson argues that because state support for marriage indirectly supports 
investment in children, state support for marriage is justified from the 
standpoint of child well-being.17  Presumably, this means that even if 
marriage is not the optimal way to achieve child well-being, it is a 
sufficiently good proxy that it should be encouraged. 
Wilson’s argument proceeds from a pragmatic stance.  The institution 
of marriage exists, as a legislative and social choice, whereas our society 
seems unlikely in the near future to adopt an alternative dependency 
system with the power to impact positively real children’s lives.18  While 
a pragmatic focus on child well-being has a good deal of merit, it 
nonetheless downplays many legitimate concerns about the social costs 
of perpetuating the current institution of marriage.  Thus, it is helpful to 
consider both those social costs and the nature of the positive effect on 
child well-being. 
IV.  WHICH CHILDREN FARE BETTER BECAUSE OF MARRIAGE?  THE 
NATURE OF THE POSITIVE EFFECT ON CHILD WELL-BEING 
To determine whether child well-being provides sufficient justification 
for state support of marriage even if marriage is not the best way to 
achieve child well-being, it is useful to consider what child well-being 
means.  Manning and Lamb and Hofferth and Anderson employ various 
indices of child well-being, which Wilson implicitly adopts, and conclude 
that children in marital homes fare better on these indices.19  However, 
neither Wilson nor the authors of the underlying studies focuses on the 
related question of which children are likely to be found in these marital 
homes and thus, which children’s well-being we maximize by supporting 
marriage. 
When one looks at which children do better because of marriage, one 
might well conclude that we should eliminate any state bias in favor of 
marriage, rather than continue to support marriage.  Children are not 
randomly distributed in married and unmarried households.  Rather, 
children in married households are whiter, wealthier, and have better 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Other commentators have constructed more radical alternatives to socio-legal 
support of marriage.  For example, Martha Fineman argues for a radical social and legal 
transformation in MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004). 
 19. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 1, at 860 (children’s verbal ability and success in 
school) and id. at 11–12 (paternal engagement in activities with children and self-reported 
“warmth” towards children). 
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educated parents for reasons other than marriage itself.20  Thus, state 
support for marriage maximizes the welfare of children who are already 
the most privileged.  State support for marriage provides far less benefit 
to children who are less privileged in terms of race and socioeconomic 
status.  Indeed, by maximizing the welfare of the privileged group of 
children, state support for marriage may actually reduce the welfare of 
less privileged children on an absolute as well as a comparative basis. 
Thus, the fact that children in married, biological families fare best 
does not necessarily mean that we should engage in marriage support or 
promotion.  To the contrary, it may well mean that we should eliminate 
any state bias in favor of marriage, even if we do not go so far as to 
abolish marriage as a civil institution.  Anita Bernstein has made the related 
argument that we can more effectively eliminate welfare disparities 
between the married and the unmarried by abolishing marriage rather 
than by supporting it.21  In the specific context of child well-being 
disparities, eliminating state support for marriage could result in children 
in the aggregate being better off because elimination of support for 
marriage would likely result in a redirection of social welfare policy 
toward the direct support of children.22  Thus, Wilson argues in favor of 
supporting marriage from the pragmatic perspective that no viable social 
welfare substitute exists that will increase child well-being.23  But, a 
viable social welfare substitute seems unlikely to develop as long as 
marriage continues to exist. 
Once one makes the assumption that child well-being is a key 
consideration (and perhaps the sole consideration for many) in whether 
to retain state support for marriage, then it may be insufficient to argue 
simply that child well-being provides some support for marriage.  Rather, 
one should ask how child well-being can be maximized.  And when one 
asks that question, state support of marriage may not be the answer. 
 
 20. See TERRY LUGAILA & JULIA OVERTURF, CHILDREN AND THE 
HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIVE IN: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-14.pdf.    
 21. Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
129, 140–41 (2003). 
 22. Certainly, children currently privileged by state support of marriage might be 
worse off under such an approach.  However, this might be justifiable on egalitarian 
principles or, alternatively, using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003) (under Kaldor-Hicks analysis, a rule or 
action is economically efficient if the winners’ gains exceed the losers’ losses, thereby 
increasing aggregate social wealth). 
 23. Wilson, supra note 1, at 877. 
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V.  IS CHILD WELL-BEING ALONE A SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION                   
FOR MARRIAGE?  ADDITIONAL SOCIAL COSTS OF STATE                          
SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE 
Further, if one can  make only the relatively weaker claim that some 
children’s well-being will be maximized by state support for marriage 
(possibly at the expense of other children), then child well-being alone 
does not provide sufficient justification for state support or promotion of 
marriage.  Rather, it becomes necessary to situate any justification for 
marriage based on child well-being within the context of additional 
justifications for marriage.  Child well-being may still contribute to a 
justification of marriage, but only if one has additional reasons to favor 
state support of marriage.24 
In Wilson’s view, “[t]he only reason we would parse the effect of 
marriage from stability is if the State could reliably foster stability in 
family relationships in some other way.  To my knowledge, there is no 
such way.”25  However, one reason to attempt to isolate the effect of 
marriage itself from the effects of stable family structures is the 
likelihood that state support for marriage is actually harming some 
members of society.  For example, state support for marriage, as 
currently conceived, has detrimental effects on people who are not in 
heterosexual relationships because they cannot access the symbolic or 
concrete benefits of marital status.  Some commentators also argue that 
state support for marriage runs counter to women’s interests.26 
VI.  ON MARRIAGE PROMOTION 
Wilson is firm in her conclusion that child well-being justifies 
continued state support of marriage.27  However, Wilson is far more 
ambivalent and tentative about any claim that child well-being might 
justify the active promotion of marriage by the state.28  Thus, the normative 
implications of the social science studies for marriage promotion, as it 
might theoretically be conceived or as it is actually practiced by the 
government or private groups, remain to be fleshed out. 
One way to think about this problem is to ask, if the state required 
everyone to be married in order to live in a household with children, 
would children be any better off?  Wilson expresses well-founded concern 
 
 24. Wilson does not focus on, but certainly does not exclude from consideration, 
the negative effects of marriage.  Id. at 878. 
 25. Id. at 877. 
 26. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 18, at 118–19. 
 27. Wilson, supra note 1, at 877. 
 28. Id. at 878.   
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that inducing less-committed couples to marry will further weaken the 
institution of marriage and eventually result in an equilibrium state 
between marriage and cohabitation, presumably with concomitant ill 
effects on child well-being.29  However, this concern coexists in tension 
with Wilson’s optimism about the transformative power of marriage.  
Ultimately, she concludes simply by expressing hope in the transformative 
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 30. Id. at 879.   
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